News Briefs and Summaries from NJSBA, January 24, 2025

from the New Jersey Judiciary – January 23, 2025

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

CRIMINAL LAW

State v. Martinez, Appellate Division, Judge Jacobs. Defendant appealed her convictions for passion/provocation manslaughter, weapons offenses, theft, and fraudulent use of a credit card, arguing that the jury instructions and verdict sheet should have allowed self-defense as a complete justification for all homicide charges, not just murder. Defendant was charged following an incident where defendant, who claimed self-defense, fatally stabbed Raul Rios during an alleged sexual assault. Subsequently, she used Rios’s credit card and disposed of his body. The trial concluded with defendant’s acquittal on charges of murder, felony murder, robbery, and kidnapping; however, the jury convicted her of lesser included charges, including passion/provocation manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for manslaughter, with additional concurrent sentences for other convictions. On appeal, defendant argued that the jury’s finding of self-defense for murder should have acquitted her of all homicide charges, including manslaughter. The state contended that the verdicts, though inconsistent, should stand. The court found that the jury instructions were flawed, as they failed to convey that self-defense, once established, applied to all homicide charges. The court reversed the conviction for passion/provocation manslaughter, emphasizing that self-defense was a complete defense to all categories of homicide. The court recommended revising the Model Criminal Jury Charges to include a verdict sheet template for cases involving self-defense across multiple homicide charges. The court affirmed all other aspects of the case and remanded for resentencing. (Approved for Publication as Redacted)

NOT APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

CRIMINAL LAW

State v. Bass, Appellate Division, Per Curiam. Defendant appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Defendant fled an attempted traffic stop and was involved in a collision. He was found with a broken leg wrapped around the driver’s seat but claimed he was asleep in the back seat at the time of the accident. Trial court granted State’s motion in limine to redact hearsay from defendant’s medical records, e.g. statements defendant made to medical personnel that he was in the back seat of the car and asleep at the time of the accident. Trial court found the statements were not subject to the medical records hearsay exception because they had “absolutely no rational[] relation to diagnosis or treatment of any of his injuries.” Car passenger testified at trial and stated he was the driver, contradicting his testimony from his own plea hearing. Jury convicted defendant on aggravated assault and eluding charges. Defendant’s PCR petition claimed trial counsel was ineffective for meeting with the passenger three times without a third party present and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the in limine ruling allowing redaction of exculpatory statements from medical records. Trial counsel explained he visited witness after receiving a letter from him. PCR court found it was necessary for defense counsel to meet with the witness, the record lacked evidence that counsel’s conduct had prejudiced defendant and defendant cited no law for the proposition “that it is ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to interview a witness with no third-party present.” Court found the actions of the defense counsel were within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment and did not affect the outcome of the trial. Trial judge correctly found defendant’s statements in his medical records regarding his location in the vehicle following the accident were inadmissible hearsay.

FAMILY LAW

S.M. v. R.R.C., Appellate Division, Per Curiam. Plaintiff appealed a post-judgment matrimonial order that granted defendant’s motion to enforce litigant’s rights. The parties had entered a Marital Settlement Agreement in 2015, requiring the sale of four marital properties in India, with proceeds to be split evenly. Plaintiff repeatedly failed to cooperate with the sale of the parties’ Chennai properties, refusing to sign a power of attorney and ignoring court orders, leading to the imposition of sanctions and attorneys’ fees against plaintiff. In October 2023, defendant received a cash offer for the Chennai properties, which plaintiff opposed, citing an action in India she had filed to partition the properties. Defendant moved to enforce litigant’s rights, seeking compliance with the sale, an order requiring plaintiff to withdraw the India action, and application of sale proceeds to attorneys’ fees and child support arrears. The trial court found plaintiff violated the MSA and refused to modify it, ordering plaintiff to comply with the sale and withdraw her India action, citing jurisdiction over plaintiff due to her New Jersey residency and prior litigation as a basis for its order. The trial court also directed the application of plaintiff’s sale proceeds to defendant’s attorneys’ fees and child support arrears, awarding additional attorneys’ fees for the enforcement motion. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion. The court affirmed finding no abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the enforceability of the MSA, the jurisdiction over plaintiff, and the equitable distribution of proceeds to satisfy obligations.

FAMILY LAW

S.L. v. D.D., Appellate Division, Per Curiam. Defendant appealed the final restraining order entered against him. Plaintiff and defendant were previously engaged. Plaintiff had previously sought a FRO based on vulgar text messages, a voice message threatening to slash her tires and an expletive-ridden text sent to her current boyfriend. Trial judge denied a FRO, finding the evidence did not amount to harassment and plaintiff was not credible. Plaintiff obtained a TRO two months later based on two new occurrences: a note left at the boyfriend’s house and a Facebook post. Second trial judge determined facts and allegations asserted at the first hearing amounted to the predicate act of harassment, found plaintiff was credible, the new allegations constituted harassment and stalking and granted the FRO. Court reversed and vacated the FRO because second trial judge erred by considering previously adjudicated facts as harassment, contrary to the first judge’s decision. The law of the case doctrine did not apply but collateral estoppel did. Court concluded that the new alleged incidents did not constitute harassment or stalking directed at the plaintiff because they lacked the requisite intent to harass her specifically.

LANDLORD TENANT LAW

Rojas-Gomez v. Tyliczka, Appellate Division, Per Curiam. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment and grant of partial summary judgment to defendant for unpaid rent in a landlord-tenant dispute. Defendant was the landlord for a property that contained two lawful residential units and one illegal basement unit lacking a certificate of occupancy. The parties entered into a lease for the basement unit in 2016. Defendant told plaintiff the unit did not have a CO. In August 2019, township issued violation notices to defendant plaintiff based on the lack of a CO. Defendant filed a summary dispossess notice based on nonpayment of rent in December 2019. Trial court granted a judgment for possession and warrant of removal. In 2020, defendant filed a complaint against plaintiff for unpaid rent. Plaintiff vacated the unit in March 2020 and defendant returned the security deposit. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and fraud, and defendant counterclaimed for unpaid rent and property damage. Trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s motion. Plaintiff argued the failure to have a CO voided the lease under a novel theory plaintiff called an “implied warranty of legality.” He also asserted trial court misapplied the equitable factors set forth in McQueen v. Brown, 342 N.J. Super. 120, erred in dismissing his complaint under the Consumer Fraud Act and defendant waived his right to unpaid rent by not withholding it from the security deposit. Court declined to fashion a new landlord-tenant doctrine based on an implied warranty of legality and agreed with trial court that public policy interests would not be advanced by rendering the lease at issue invalid given that plaintiff did not raise any habitability concerns during his three-year tenancy. Court found no extreme conduct or false statement of fact by landlord that would constitute an unlawful practice under the CFA. Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant waived his right to unpaid rent by returning the security deposit, noting that defendant had already initiated a separate action for the unpaid rent and did not withdraw it upon returning the deposit.